Dossier no. 14 – The Amazigh language within Morocco’s language
policy [1]
Introduction
The present paper intends to provide,
in the first section, a socio-linguistic description of the Amazigh language
in Morocco, taking into account its linguistic aspects, the ethnicity of its
speakers, its usage and functions within society, its ideological-institutional
aspects, and, at last, its future perspectives.
Based on a macro-linguistic perspective, in the second section we will introduce
the language policy model that is being implemented for each language, focusing
on Amazigh. Then, we will confirm that the existing imbalance in the status
is mainly due to a monolingual-type language policy, which does not take into
account the wide use of the other languages, but solely classical Arabic.
Finally, we will discuss the educational policy carried out since Moroccan
independence up to the present time, giving a particular emphasis to the current
language policy implemented by the Ministry of Education.
1. Socio-linguistic description of the Amazigh language
1.1. About the
concept of “Berber”
There has always been a bit of confusion when designating the languages spoken
by some North African and Sub-Saharan peoples, as well as by other peoples
in Egypt and the Arabian Peninsula. These are mainly known as “Berber
languages”.
The term “Berber” is actually of Greek origin (barbaros, -on)
and was used by the Greeks to designate the foreign peoples speaking languages
other than the so-called classical Greek, i.e. foreign languages to them.
Later on, this same term (barna[ic]us,-a, -un, from which the term
“Berberisc” also arises) was used by the Romans to designate the
peoples in North Africa who did not speak Latin. Thus, this area would start
to be later on known as Berberia. When the Arabs arrived (670-800 A.D.) in
the north of Africa, they kept the same name, adapting it to their language;
in fact, they started using the word “Al barbar” or “Al
barbari” –its singular form– to designate the peoples,
and “Al barbaria” to refer to their language.
On the other hand, Moroccan Amazigh-speakers use their own term “amazighen”,
a masculine noun meaning “the free men”, although the most widely
used term is its feminine form –“tamazight”–,
a term used by Amazigh-speakers to designate their language. Nowadays, the
word “Berber” is used by foreigners to refer to the inhabitants
of the areas where the Amazigh language is spoken; needless to say, Amazigh-speakers
do not use the term “Berber” to designate neither their
people or their language, but it is a foreign imposition that they consider
to a certain extent as inappropriate, as it causes confusion.
It may also be pointed out that the concept of “Berber language”
is essentially political: as a matter of fact, it does not correspond to a
homogeneous socio-linguistic reality in the minds of the speakers of this
language.
1.2. The linguistic
aspects
As regards the origin of the Amazigh language, several efforts have been made
to find out its exact source and its subsequent expansion, but in the end
the most widely accepted theory among specialists is the one that suggests
an Afro-Asiatic origin, a family in which languages like old Egyptian, Cushitic,
or Chadic are found. [2]
The varieties of the Amazigh language –from Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia,
Libya, Yemen, Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso– are a reflection of its
linguistic evolution depending on the specific geographical, economic and
political conditions of each group. However, among the different varieties
of the Amazigh language –divided in three main groups: Amazigh from
Morocco (including three varieties: Tarifit, Tachelhit and Tamazight), Amazigh
from Kabyle (Algeria), and Tuareg– there are few differences in terms
of vocabulary and grammar, and therefore Amazigh-speakers can understand and
communicate with each other [3].
Here are some examples that illustrate the variation among the three groups
that make up the Amazigh language:
English |
Amazigh
from Morocco |
Amazigh
from Kabyle |
Tuareg |
| One | yan | yiwen | isen |
| To go | ddu | ruh | eyel |
| Tolerance | iggigen | rreud | éggag |
Moreover, it is also noteworthy the fact that, due to the contact there has been and still is between Amazigh and Arabic (both classical and spoken), Amazigh has taken a number of words from Arabic, such as:
English |
Arabic |
Amazigh |
| Religon | addin | eddin |
| Mother | umm | ymma |
| Blood | adamu | idamen |
| Book | alkitab | taktabt
(en la Cabilia) lektab (en Marruecos y en tuareg) |
On the phenomenon of the
borrowings, Chaker Salem (1991: 226) states that:
“En Kabyle et en Chleuh [Chleuh are the varieties of Amazigh from
Morocco] les emprunts se répartissent de façon égale
entre les verbes et les substantifs: Kabyle: 38% d’emprunt parmi les
verbes, taux global 38%, Chleuh: 24% d’emprunts parmi les verbes, taux
global 25%, seul le Touareg accuse un certain déséquilibre de
ce point de vue, puisqu’il y a prés de deux fois plus d’emprunts
parmi les substantifs que parmi les verbes. La situation touarégue
paraît tout fait normale, car les verbes s’empruntent plus difficilement
que les noms et il faut atteindre un niveau de contacts très prégnant
pour les verbes étrangères sont aussi bien représentés
que les substantifs.”
Nonetheless, the present situation of Amazigh lexicography does not allow
us to get a much deeper insight, so that the few examples we have provided
should suffice to approximately prove our point.
On the other hand, it would be impossible to make a syntactical description
of the Amazigh language in just a few lines, so we will instead provide a
list with the most significant works, those considered to be of useful reference,
at the end of the present paper.
As for the alphabet of the Amazigh language, up to now 23 phonemes have been
registered, although it is not certain whether there existed more in earlier
times. Furthermore, even though nowadays Amazigh is just a spoken language,
there is also a graphical representation for it, with 41 letters, known as
tifinag. So far, more than 1,200 pre-islamic inscriptions have been
found, plus other inscriptions and drawings carved on stones in Berber Sahara
and on the Canary Islands. Such inscriptions show the existence of an Amazigh
writing, which probably derived from the Libyan alphabet. However, nowadays
its written form is going through a static phase, due to a lack of usage or,
as Salem Chaker
(1999: 25) states, “partout l’écrit reste un épiphénomène
sans ancrage profond pour l’instant.”
1.3. The distribution
of speakers on the territory
The varieties of Amazigh extend along the Mediterranean coast, from Morocco
(including the Canary Islands) to Egypt, and towards the south, from the Mediterranean
coast to the Niger River. Their most outstanding feature is the great distance
that exists between the countries where Amazigh is spoken, which hinders the
processes of language exchange and planning among them. This situation causes
the existence of greater differences and more heterogeneity among the varieties
of Amazigh.
In Morocco the Amazigh language is divided in three varieties, depending on
the area and the communities:
1-Tamazight, spoken in the mountains of the Middle Atlas and the High Atlas.
2-Tarifit, spoken in the Riff Mountains, in the north of the country.
3-Tachelhit, spoken in the Anti-Atlas and in the Sus Mountains, in the south.
According to official
statistics compiled in 1994, Morocco has 28 million inhabitants, of which
90% speak Moroccan Arabic, while the three varieties of Amazigh are spoken
by 30% of the population. As regards the Amazigh varieties, there are 2,5
million Tachelhit-speakers in the south of Morocco –known as Sus–,
3 million Tamazight-speakers in the Atlas Mountains, and about 1,7 million
Tarifit-speakers in the Riff [4].
However, these data do not correspond to those reported by some associations
of defence of the Amazigh language. These, such as Congrès International
de la Langue Amazigh, Association Marocaine de Recherche et d’Èchanges
Culturels and Association Kabyle International-France, assert
that more than 50% of the population speak Amazigh and are of Amazigh origin
on their father’s or mother’s side. One should not forget the
speakers of an origin other than Amazigh, but who speak one of the varieties
of Amazigh, so that this figure could be raised up to an 80% of Amazigh-speakers.[5]
The amount of Moroccan Amazigh-speakers living in the enclaves of Ceuta and
Melilla must also be added to these figures, although most of them have a
Spanish passport. However, in these two cities the Amazigh language has no
official status, therefore, for the time being it is a minoritised language.
1.4. Usage and
functions
When discussing the usage of a language, reference is made to the amount of
speakers and the status it enjoys within society. If we apply the data provided
above to the Amazigh language in Morocco, we may say that its usage is restricted
to family circles, since not all Moroccan citizens speak the language. However,
from the point of view of the territorial distribution of the language, we
can also say that in the areas where Amazigh is spoken, its usage is more
extended, as, in fact, it is present in everyday life and, in some occasions,
in the public administration as well, only when the staff are Amazigh-speakers.
On the other hand, it is an exclusively oral-type usage, never written.
In regard to the use of these varieties in the mass media, there is a state
radio station, which broadcasts daily and devotes some time to each variety.
Moreover, for the last few years, the first state television channel has been
broadcasting a news programme in Amazigh. In the written press, as the so-called
“Amazigh cause” has recently gained significance, there is some
tolerance for the publication of magazines which cover exclusively linguistic,
anthropological and historical topics regarding the Amazigh language and culture,
such as Imazhegen, Tifinagh: revue mensuelle de culture et de
civilisations ”maghrébine” or Tasafut. All
three were quite famous and prestigious, but are not published any more. Today,
a few weekly and monthly magazines are published, such as Le Monde Amazigh,
Akraou Amazigh or Tawiza.
So there is no doubt that the Amazigh language still has a significant weight
within the Moroccan society, given its dynamism. Furthermore, a more relevant
aspect may be pointed out, namely the capacity of a language to reflect identity
features of an ethno-linguistic group within another group –that of
the Arabic-speakers– in all aspects. Thus, the Amazigh language, besides
being a communication tool, is able to transmit the particularities and characteristics
of a deep-rooted culture within the Moroccan society.
In the field of education, we may state that the teaching of Amazigh is scarce
in comparison with classical Arabic, French, English, and Spanish, since it
is not taught in school, in spite of the royal decrees (dahirs) that introduced
educational programmes –mainly the Royal Decree no. 1-01-299, of October
17, 2001 (29 rajab al khaïr 1422)–, but they still have not been
implemented. By contrast, there are some educational programmes, although
very few, in establishments of non-formal education, such as the Amazigh language
and culture teaching programme of the French Institute of Agadir, and other
classes given in some associations or NGOs working on the dissemination and
protection of this language, both in Morocco and in other countries.
1.5. The ideological-institutional
aspects of the Amazigh language
As above mentioned, Amazigh is a dominated language: although it is widely
spoken, it is in fact a minoritised language, since it is not acknowledged
by institutions.
On the other hand, politicians and linguists usually present it as a series
of tongues, stressing its mainly oral character. These language varieties
have been given many different designations: dialects, varieties, wild tongues,
indigenous languages, etc., so they have never been fully acknowledged as
a language, as linguists have done, especially in language atlases.
In Moroccan official texts like the Mudawana (the civil code) and,
in particular, the Constitution no reference is made to Amazigh; as a matter
of fact, it has no institutional status. This is also the case of official
political speeches and all institutional texts, which systematically avoid
any mention to the term “Amazigh”. The situation is the same in
the rest of countries where Amazigh is spoken, except in Mali and Niger, where
the varieties of the Amazigh language are considered as national languages.
As for the status of Amazigh in Morocco, one of the aspects that have to be
stressed out is the role France played in the elimination of the Moroccan
national identity, by using the Amazigh people as a tool. On the one side,
France strove to present the countries with a significant portion of Amazigh-speakers
as a mosaic of hostile ethnic groups, and, on the other hand, it tried to
evangelise the Amazigh people, thus provoking a feeling of rejection against
their Arabic-speaking fellow countrymen; they even intended to leave aside
the religious bonds shared by the Arabs and the Amazigh people.
The adoption of the Addahir albarbari (Berber Decree) in 1931 proves
this strategy. This decree tried to create some kind of separation between
the Amazigh-speaking population and the Arabic-speaking population, as it
aimed at promoting the linguistic, religious and territorial independence
of Moroccan Amazigh-speakers from Moroccan Arabic-speakers. However, this
decree was rejected by both parties, which were engaged in their resistance
against French colonialism.
Given its authority and dominant position, France could have taken many different
initiatives: it had the chance to promote an Amazigh-language education –especially
in Algeria, where it stayed the longest– and, among other things, to
create Amazigh-language institutions, press and mass media. The only action
that France carried out was the creation of a Centre of Berber Studies in
Azrou, close to Meknès, an area with a high portion of Amazigh-speakers;
however, later on this centre was closed.
In short, the language policy on the Amazigh language in the French colonisation
period, as pointed out by Chaker Salem (1999:12):
“n’était q’une illustration particulière
d’options générales, déjà mises en oeuvre
au sein du territoire Français: la centralisation absolue et la liquidation
des particularismes régionaux. Au delà de la phraséologie,
l’État Français ne pouvait avoir que mépris pour
les dialectes berbères sans tradition écrite et diversifiés
á l’extrême. La seule perspective qu’il pouvait concevoir
á leur sujet était leur lente disparition.”
As a consequence, when
independence was gained, Moroccan language policy was re-defined in an irreversible
manner: since then, classical Arabic has been and still is the official language.
It must also be pointed out that, both before and after independence was gained,
the three varieties of Amazigh of Morocco have not undergone a process of
codification and normalisation; as a matter of fact, no grammar with the common
rules of the whole Amazigh language has been written. Moreover, the teaching
processes of the Amazigh language have been very scarce and poor throughout
history.
Given the definition of a vernacular language provided by UNESCO –“the
mother tongue of a minority group being socially dominated by another group
which speaks another language” (from Ninyoles, 1972:181)–, we
may say that Amazigh has the status of a vernacular language, since in Morocco,
according to the perception that the majority of Moroccan citizens have of
it and to its social practice, it is a domestic and family language.
1.6. Future perspectives
EnIn regard to the perspectives of the Amazigh language, in the last ten years
an “Amazigh” defence movement has arisen[6];
this movement is composed by a number of associations which organise cultural
activities, in order to disseminate the intellectual thought of university
students, politicians involved in the Amazigh issue and other socio-political
agents. As a starting point for their claims, in 1991 several cultural associations
wrote the Charte d’Agadir relative aux droits linguistiques et culturels
[7], which intended
to contribute to the overall project of building a national democratic culture.
Moreover, on March 1, 2000, after two years of intense debate, 229 intellectuals
signed a manifesto –Le Manifeste Berbère [8]–
considered up to now as a very relevant document of the Amazigh movement in
Morocco.
As a consequence of the rise of this movement, the State policy concerning
the Amazigh issue has changed: in October 1999 the Charte Nationale d’Éducation
et de Formation (National Charter for Education and Training) was adopted
and on October 17, 2001, the Royal Decree establishing the creation of the
IRCAM (Institut Royal de la Culture Amazighe – Royal Institute
of Amazigh Culture). Both texts claim the need to establish the teaching of
Amazigh and the presence of the Amazigh culture in the educational system.
Thus, we may say that the future perspectives are in some ways positive in
comparison with previous times, as for instance in the 60’s, the 70’s
or the 80’s, when the Amazigh language suffered repression. Even the
institutional position, and especially that of the King, is showing more respect
for the language, considering, for example, the recent creation of the Royal
Institute of Amazigh Culture, in October 2001.
The most relevant aspect of the rise of the Amazigh movement is the impulse
with which it has extended beyond the intellectual and university circles,
presenting the Amazigh issue as a responsibility for all Moroccan citizens.
During the last years, the public opinion is more aware of the Amazigh language
issue; a proof for this is the great number of active pro-Amazigh associations
in Morocco, which have increased in the last two years.
It would be worthwhile investigating whether those responsible for the State
consider it as a separatist movement which is endangering the country’s
unity. If this were the case, the socio-political status of the Amazigh language
and culture within Moroccan everyday life could change. [9]
2. Language policy and normalisation processes
2.1. The language
policy model
When many of the Maghreb countries gained independence, including Morocco,
most of them faced a complex linguistic situation: multilingualism, with a
clear prevalence of the colonial language. For ideological reasons, the language
policy that was implemented –the imposition of Arabic as the only official
language– created a situation of imbalance in the status of the other
languages and, therefore, there was a situation of diglossia. Furthermore,
efforts were made to hide the language conflict that could arise as a consequence
of such language policy. These ideological-type criteria, which lead to on
which the implemented language policy was based are related with a general
policy based on the grounds of the State-nation.
As regards the case of Morocco, its language policy has always been utterly
monolingual, as it has followed a mono-modal pattern, characterised by the
official status of the language of the dominant group, in this case Arabic,
and at the same time the maintenance of the colonisation language, due to
the requirements of the new State-nation. Nevertheless, the situation is exceptional,
for different reasons, as the reality is multilingual. The first reason is
that no large-scale scientific or social actions have been carried out in
order to modify the diglossic relationship between the languages and to improve
the status of the minoritised languages. On the other hand, it is necessary
to point out that the Moroccan situation, if not the same, is very similar
to the one in other Maghreb countries, for instance Algeria or Tunisia, where
there is a situation of multilingualism and where the Amazigh language is
present. However, none of the language policies that have been implemented
have yet been able to change the situation of minoritisation and status imbalance
between the different languages.
The second reason is that, in the case of Morocco, and as far as the Amazigh
language is concerned, in spite of the lack of a language planning of the
three varieties, they are spoken by at least a third of the population –over
10 million people–, and its common and everyday usage has been kept,
although with a great imbalance concerning its political and social status.
Thus, language policy in Morocco may be considered as the cause of the status
imbalance of the Amazigh language, and it then seems to create the imbalance
in its social use functions.
This imbalance or inequality between the status, the usage and the perception
of languages is still present in other colonised countries. Algeria and Tunisia
are examples of this, as above mentioned, as their situation is similar to
that of the current diglossic situation in Morocco.
In 1962, the year Algeria gained independence, it was a totally frenchified
country; today it is a widely arabised country and its language policy is
designed to maintain this situation. In the Maghreb, and particularly in Algeria,
arabisation (restitution of Arabic) has taken place because the mother tongues
of the population groups in Algeria –Algerian Arabic and Kabyle, depending
on the region– are two non-graphical variants of classical Arabic and
Amazigh, respectively. On the other hand, Arabic, classical or literary, which
was introduced with the arrival of Islam in the 7th century, was the only
written language before colonisation imposed French –written and spoken–
and took an official status.
Nonetheless, as Grandguillome (1997: 3) points out:
"La politique linguistique des autorités algériennes
aurait pu aboutir, pour les parlers arabes, à une solution «à
l'égyptienne»: un mélange subtil d'arabe classique et
de langues locales. Mais les parlers berbères? Leur vice premier, c'est
qu'ils témoignent d'une Algérie antérieure à la
conquête arabe. De surcroît, il n'y a pas d'intercompréhension
avec les parlers arabes. Leur disparition était donc programmée
par la logique même de l'arabisation, mais aussi du fait des pratiques
du pouvoir. Avec un résultat redoutable: des fractions importantes
de la population, pour lesquelles les langues locales représentent
un support identitaire, se sentent exclues de la nouvelle construction nationale"
On the other hand, the political thought of traditional arabists presents
arabisation as a language struggle between Arabic and French, which is true
inasmuch as the first took the position of French and is, so far, the national
and official language. Furthermore, the most conservative sectors perceive
this as a conflict with France, even with Algerians who use French in their
everyday activities, who are called «hizb de Fransa»,
i.e. those who sustain the French model.
It is noteworthy that the arabisation process in the other Maghreb countries,
at least Algeria, has had the same consequences as in Morocco, especially
regarding the relationship among languages and their political status.
2.2. The status
of languages
Given the current situation and depending on the individual circumstances
of each language and the number of speakers, Morocco can be said to have minority
and majority languages. Two other concepts can also be used, in terms of the
type of language policy carried out by the State: languages which are protected
by the dominant political powers and unprotected languages. Henri Boyer (1997:
13, 14) states that:
“l’histoire nous enseigne cependant que la langue dominante
(pour des raisons évidemment peu linguistiques) finit par marginaliser
la / les langue(s) dominée(s) et par se substituer purement et simplement
á elle(s). La sociolinguistique périphérique soutient
que la diglossie instaure une hiérarchie et donc une distribution inégalitaire
des usages des langues en présence, une subordination sociolinguistique
(Lamuela 1987 et 1994), un déséquilibre et, en définitive,
une instabilité (Gardy et Lafont 1981, Lafont 1979 et 1989, Jardel
1982, Boyer 1991, Kremnitz 1987 et 1991.)".
Based on the current relationship
among the languages in Morocco and their social function, the situation is
the following:
There are two groups of languages, in terms of their usage sphere: 1) institutional
languages, and 2) communication languages. The first group includes those
languages with a majority-type usage, i.e. classical Arabic and French, while
the group of communication languages (mother languages, which are commonly
used) encompasses two sub-groups, that of majority languages used on an everyday
basis, i.e. Amazigh and Moroccan Arabic, and that of minority languages, that
is French, classical Arabic and, sometimes, Spanish.
As above mentioned, French and classical Arabic are the only two languages
allowed in the institutional sphere, which is due, among other things, to
the fact that both undergo a strict normalisation process, as there is only
one type of normative French, the one proposed and defended by the Académie
Française, and the same goes for classical Arabic, whose normalisation
and evolution is followed up by the Arabisation Coordination Bureau. However,
it must be emphasised that, even though there is a conflict of prestige and
power between these two languages, Arabic has incorporated many terms of French
origin in order to make up for its scientific and communicative needs, which
is a normal phenomenon, given that both languages are in contact. But then,
can we admit that both languages seem to be socio-politically protected? On
this issue Youssi (1983: 77) believes that: “L’arabe classique
et le français sont acquis à l’école, c’est-á-dire
par l’instruction formelle. Cependant, si l’AC est la langue de
«prestige» lue et écrite, le français est la langue
de pouvoir, qui est parlée, lue et écrite.»
And what about Moroccan Arabic and Amazigh? It is known that their everyday
use is much wider than that of classical Arabic, French or Spanish; as a matter
of fact, their evolution has been very spontaneous and fast because they are
not subject to a written tradition or a spelling or grammatical normalisation;
they have an oral tradition. On the other hand, according to those who defend
classical Arabic, they both lack a great deal of technical, philosophical
and abstract terms, and, in their opinion, they cannot be compared to classical
Arabic. [10]
Concerning the status of languages in Morocco, Castellanos i Llorenç
(1997: 10.3.2) points out that:
“Les diferències d'estatus lingüístic i d'ús
de les diferents varietats lingüístiques utilitzades al Marroc
estableixen unes relacions de tipus jeràrquic […] l'àrab
estàndard és l'única varietat lingüística
que té l'estatus jurídic de llengua nacional tot i que és
una varietat que posseeix un nombre reduït d'usuaris reals (avaluat entre
un 10 i un 15% de la població). Amb un nombre d'usuaris més
reduït encara, la llengua francesa posseeix "un paper privilegiat"
en el sistema educatiu. L'àrab dialectal és la llengua materna
dels marroquins no-amazighòfons i funciona de facto com la llengua
vehicular dels marroquins, i també com a llengua franca ja que és
utilitzada entre els arabòfons i entre aquells amazighòfons
que utilitzen parlars allunyats”.
In such circumstances,
when different languages are in contact, the oral ones are usually treated
in a pejorative and discriminative way, they are politically and socially
disdained, as those who defend the use of classical Arabic have held and still
hold political power and take part in all language policy processes.
Taking into account the way in which some languages are unequally treated,
the situation of the Amazigh language may be even more difficult, because
it is ignored by the current language planning and, therefore, it is minoritised
by classical Arabic and Moroccan Arabic, whose dialectal status is somehow
accepted, while Amazigh is dealt with as a simple folklore element of Moroccan
culture. Aït Lamkedem (1999: 31) points out that: “la culture
berbère intervient épisodiquement dans les médias télévisuels
comme une composante folklorique nationale de divertissement.”
[11]
Considering this general approach towards the Amazigh language, without doubt
those who defend the Arabic language see Amazigh as a “wild”,
totally useless language, which is to be assimilated by the other languages,
as Aït Lamkedem (1999: 32) points out: “plus les instances
gouvernementales renforcent les idées impliquant de grandes différences
entre ces variantes [i.e. of the Amazigh language], alors perçus
comme autant de dialectes sauvages non structurés et non opérationnels”.
In Morocco, the State’s language policy has created a situation of imbalance
among languages, which will most likely evolve later on into a language conflict.
Needless to say, in Morocco today, with the creation of the Royal Institute
of the Amazigh Cultu [12],
a new Amazigh language planning and normalisation policy has been launched,
so that this language can be introduced not only into the educational system,
but into the different spheres of everyday life.
Moreover, since Mohammed VI came to the throne, the official position concerning
Morocco’s language policy and the situation of its languages has been
altered, as the country’s existing multilingualism has been explicitly
acknowledged. In this line, in a speech given by King Mohammed VI on July
31, 2001 in Khenifra, direct reference was made not only to Morocco’s
Arabian character, but also to its Amazigh character. This speech is crucial
within the history of the country’s language policy, because not only
did it acknowledge the Amazigh identity of a majority of Moroccan citizens,
but it also established the creation of the new Royal Institute of Amazigh
Culture (IRCAM), by virtue of the Royal Decree no. 1-01-299, of October 17,
2001 (29 rajab al khaïr 1422).
Thus, with this new language policy a new period for the Amazigh language
has started in Morocco and, as a consequence, much hope is given to more than
10 million speakers of Amazigh, as one of the main functions of this institution
is to promote the Amazigh language in all fields, especially in the educational
system.
3. Educational
policy in Morocco
In the
field of education, it should be noted that until 1958, two years after Morocco
gained independence, education was in French. Afterwards, i.e. since 1965,
Morocco started its arabisation policy, which was described as being horizontal,
since it was gradually introduced. Thus, the arabisation of the primary education
lasted three years and the secondary education was arabised within the following
seven years. By carrying on this policy, by 1980 Morocco had fully arabised
the first four levels of primary education, while in secondary education 25%
to 50% of the subjects were taught only in Arabic. It was not until 1990 that
primary and secondary education were totally arabised. As for universities,
up to now some studies are bilingual, for instance the studies of law and
economics; by contrast, science studies and higher education colleges and
institutes still use French.
Nonetheless, the cultural and linguistic context of Morocco is characterised
by the significance of Arabic as well as by the presence of Amazigh, French
and Spanish, which is a proof of the country’s existing multilingualism.
Moreover, the presence of Islam, which constitutes a fundamental value associated
with the Monarchy, must also be taken into account, as it represents a symbol
of unity within this context of plurality and linguistic, cultural and ethnic
diversity. Based on these factors, Morocco first established its Constitution
and its Mudawana (the civil code), by virtue of which the Islamic
law, which was based on the Koran and the Sunna –the actions
and sayings of the Prophet–, was given preference, and, then, Arabic
became the official language. As regards the field of education, although
a great proportion of the Moroccan population has one of the three Amazigh
varieties as their mother tongue, it has never been carried out in Amazigh,
since the educational and language policy has always been monolingual (first
in French and then in Arabic).
The new educational policy
of Morocco was initiated after a speech given by the former king of Morocco,
Hassan II, in March 1999, in which he made reference to the need to reform
the Moroccan educational system and establish a new language policy in this
field. Shortly afterwards, during the 1999-2000 school year, the National
Charter for Education and Training was adopted; as the aim of such a Charter
was to restructure the Moroccan educational system, it included a series of
articles which are related with the future language policy that is to be implemented
in the educational system.
Today, with the adoption of this act, the presence of the other languages
has been acknowledged, on the one hand; it even mentions the need to have
an open approach towards the Amazigh language. On the other hand, it makes
reference to the importance of improving the educational system and the teaching
of foreign languages, and even to the need to have a good command of them
and use them in class.
Finally, it should be found out whether the type of language policy set out
by the Charter is compatible with the country’s socio-linguistic reality
and with the educational practice carried out. Moreover, it would be most
interesting to investigate to what extent the situation of multilingualism
can be a source of conflict among languages, especially between classical
Arabic and foreign languages.
_________________
| [1] | The author, Adil Moustaoui, is a PhD student at the Faculty of Arts of the Universidad Autónoma de Madrid (Department of Linguistics, Modern Languages, Logics, Philosophy of Science, Literary Theory and Comparative Literature). |
| [2] | OUAKRIM, O. Fonética y fonología del Bereber. Servei de Publications de Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, 1995. |
| [3] | See CHAKER, S. Manuel de linguistique Berbére I. Alger: Editions Bouchéne, 1991. |
| [4] | Up to now, in Morocco no statistical survey has been carried out on the number of speakers of each of the three varieties of Amazigh; the data provided are just estimations. |
| [5] | This information was published in a dossier of the magazine Tel quel (no. 3, November 2001), which had a great impact in Morocco. |
| [6] | See OUAZI, E. H. [The Birth of the Amazigh Cultural Movement in Morocco]. Rabat: Imprimerie Al Maarif Al jadida, 2000. [in Arabic] |
| [7] | The text of the Charte d’Agadir is available at http://www.tlfq.ulaval.ca/axl/afrique/charte_berbere.htm |
| [8] | The text of Le Manifeste Berbère is available, among others, at http://www.mondeberbere.com/societe/manifeste.htm |
| [9] | See KRATOCHWIL, G. “Les associations culturelles Amazighes au Maroc. Bilans et perspectives”. IN: Prologues: revue maghrébine du livre, no. 17. Casablanca, 1999. |
| [10] | For further research, see EL JABRI, M. A. Le Maroc moderne. La spécificité, l’identité et le développement. Casablanca: Éd. Banchera, 1998. By the same author, Projet d’une vision progressiste sur quelques problèmes pédagogiques et culturels. Casablanca, 1972. See also SAAF, A. “L’idée de l’unité arabe dans le discours politique maghrébin”. IN: Annuaire de l’Afrique du Nord. Paris: CNRS, 1985. |
| [11] | See BOUKOUS, A. “ La langue berbère et la culture amazighes. Entre la plénitude du fait et la vacuité du droit”. IN: Prologues: revue maghrébine du livre, no. 17. Casablanca, 1999. p. 22-29, or EL QUADÉRY, M. “Les berbères entre le mythe colonial et la négation national. Le cas du Maroc”. IN: Revue d’histoire moderne et contemporaine, no. 45, Vol 2. Montpellier, 1998. |
| [12] | The Royal Decree adopted in October 2001, establishing the creation of the IRCAM, was published in Arabic and French. Excerpts of the French version and their English translation are included in the present dossier. |